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or operating a telephone exchange, to furnish, without unreasonable delay, without
discrimination, and without any further or additional charge to the person, firm, or
corporation applying for the same, including all telegraph companies, a telephone,
or telephones, with all the proper or necessary fixtures, as well as connection with
the central office or telephone exchange, if desired, and shall connect the telephone
of such person, firm, or corporation, with the telephone of any other person, firm,
or corporation, having a connection with the same, or a connecting exchange, or
central office, whenever requested so to do, without regard to the character of the
messages to be transmitted, provided they are not obscure [sic] or profane; and
every person, or corporation, neglecting, or refusing, to comply with any of the
provisions of this act, shall forfeit not less than twenty-five, nor more than one
hundred dollars for each and every day such neglect, or refusal, shall continue, one
half to the use of the person, or corporation, prosecuting therefor.
SEC. 2. This act shall take effect and De in force, from and after its passage and
publication.
JoHn B. UHLE.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of California.
SESLER v. MONTGOMERY.
i. A husband may address words to his wife, in private, which would be slanderous of another person, if spoken in the presence of a third person.
2. An eavesdropper, listening to the conversation of the defendant and his
wife, is not such a third person.
3. The common law rule, that the civil existence of the wife is merged in that
of her husband, still obtains, save where an exception has been legally established.

Action for slander. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff
Defendant appeals from the judgment and from an order denying a new trial.
In bank: on rehearing. The former opinion is on page 271,
ante.
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23, 1889). The evidence shows that
the alleged slanderous words were spoken (if at all) in the
house of the defendant in a conversation addressed exclusively
McFARLAND,

J. (March
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to his wife; and the question to be determined is this: Did
the speaking of the words, under these circumstances, to his
wife alone, constitute a "publication" within the meaning of
that word as used in the definition of slander? (The plaintiff
was eavesdropping, and claims to have heard the alleged slanderous words from a point outside of the door of the room in
which defendant and his wife were talking.)
The Codes of this State provide how marriages may be entered into and how divorces may be obtained, and they also
have certain provisions, different from the rules of the common
law, about the propeifty of the spouses, and, to a limited extent, about their power to make contracts, etc. But in the
Codes there is no attempt made to change the essential nature
of marriage, or to state its manifold incidents and consequences, or to establish new rules for the solution of the various questions which arise out of those incidents and consequences. Moreover, although the Codes define slander as a
"false and unprivileged publication" of certain matters, they
do not declare what shall constitute "publication." For the
determination of these questions, therefore-as there are no
provisions about them in the Codes-we must look to the
common law, which is the basis of our jurisprudence. Political
Code, § 4468; Van Maren v. Johnson (i86o), 15 Cal. 308. It is
admitted to be the settled rule that there can be no publication
within the meaning of the law of slander unless the words
alleged to be slanderous are spoken to, and in the presence of,
a third person; that is, a person other than the one who speaks
and the one to whom the words are spoken. A man entirely
alone cannot commit slander by talking aloud to himself And
the final question to be solved is whether a wife, when spoken
to by her husband in the privacy of home, and not in the presence of others, is a "third person" within the meaning of the
law under review, or whether, under those circumstances, there
should be applied the doctrine that the husband and wife are,
civilly, one person. There is no doubt of the general common-law rule that the civil existence of the wife is merged in
that of her husband. Blackstone says that "by marriage the
husband and wife are one person in law," and that "the legal
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or,
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at least, is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband." Vol. 1, 442. Upon this principle of the legal
union of husbands and wives most of their rights, duties, and
disabilities depended. They could not be witnesses for or
against each other because of the maxims, nemo in prop-iz
causa testis esse debet, and nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare. And
upon this ground it has been always held that no prosecution
for conspiracy can be maintained against a husband and wife
only; because the crime of conspiracy cannot be committed
by one person alone, and a husband and wife are but one person in law. i Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 448, § 8; I Russell on Crimes, 39; People v. Richards(1885), 67 Cal. 412. It is
said that this rule was a legal fiction, and that in the course of
modern legislation and judicial decisions it has been exploded.
But it is no more a fiction than any other general principle of
law, and we have seen no authentic account of the explosion.
There always were some exceptions to the rule, from the earliest history of the common law, and modern legislation and
decision have merely created additional exceptions. The general rule still obtains, save where an exception has been legally established, and we have been referred to no decision
establishing an exception as to the point involved in the case
at bar. Indeed, the only case in point cited at all is from an
inferior court of New York (Trumbull v. Gibbons (1818), 3 City
H. Rec. 97), in which it was directly held that the delivery of a
defamatory manuscript by a husband to a wife was not a publication. And every sound consideration of public policy,
every just regard for the integrity and inviolability of the marriage relation-the most confidential relation known to the
law-should restrain a court from establishing the exception
upon which the judgment in the case at bar rests. When
husbands and wives talk to each other alone, the conversation
differs but little from the process of talking to one's self, or, as
it is sometimes called, "thinking aloud." There is no intention that the conversation shall be repeated to others, and no
presumption that it will be. It would be strange, indeed, if a
husband or wife could not safely say anything to the other
about their neighbors or acquaintances which he or she would
not feel warranted in saying to the world. Such a rule would
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destroy all opportunity for confidential conference, advice, or
suggestion. To a curious person asking what had occurred
between a husband and wife in the seclusion of their home,
the appropriate answer would be, id est nuftfier /ui negotii. It
has been held in another State that there was a sufficient publication of a libel where a letter was sent to a wife containing
defamatory matter about her husband; and it is argued that
the court making the decision must have held the wife to be a
third person. Schenck v. Schenck (1843), 20 N. J. L. 208.
Whether or not that decision was a correct exposition of the
law, it is clear, at least, that another principle was involved.
As the Court say in that case: "Such a communication, made
directly to the wife, is an attempt to poison the fountain of domestic peace, conjugal affection, and filial obligation at their
very sources." There the exception which was allowed to the
general rule, was in support of the confidential relation of marriage, while in the case at bar the exception sought to be established would be destructive of that relation. Our conclusion is that a communication from a husband to a wife, not in
*the presence of any other person, does not constitute a publication within the meaning of the law of slander. It follows
from this conclusion that the judgment in the case at bar was
erroneous. Judgment and order appealed from reversed, and
cause remanded.
We

concur:

PATERSON,

J.;

BEATTY, C. J.; WORKS, J.; SHA1RPSTEIN, J.;

THORNTON, J.

Notwithstanding the statement of the
California Court, that they had not in
December last, been able to find any
case exactly in point, the Queen's Bench
Division of the English High Court of
Justice, on the seventh of the previous
February (1888), did decide precisely
this principle, as the California Court
now declares it to be: W/ennhak v.
Mforgan, 20 Q. B. Div. 635. HUDDLESTON, B., in delivering the opinions, said-" this is, as far as we know,
the first time it has ever been alleged
in cases of this kind, that the handing

over of a libel, by the libeller, to his
wife, is a publication. I think that the
question can be decided on the common
law principle, that husband and wife
are one. The uttering of a libel to the
party libelled is clearly no publication
for the purposes of a civil action. "And
if a libel is uttered on a privileged occasion, to a husband, when his wife is
present, it has been held that her presence does not take away the privilege.
In Odgers on Libel and Slander, 2nd
ed. p. 153, there is a reference to Trumbull v. Gibbons (II8), 3 City Hall Re-
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corder (N. Y.) 97, an American case,
of which there is a note in Towshend
on Slander and Libel as follows:
"Gibbons wrote defamatory matter of
Trumbull, and had fifty copies printed
in pamphlet form, in Massachusetts.
Forty-five copies he retained, and five
copies he sent to his wife, in New Jersey, indorsing four of them with the
names of certain persons, acquaintances
of the wife, but without any instructions to the wife as to how she should
dispose of the copies so sent to her.
The wife delivered two of the copies in
New Jersey, to the persons whose names
were indorsed thereon, and the others
she delivered in New Jersey, to Trumbull, who exhibited them to various
persons. On Trumbull suin, Gibbons
in New York for libel, it was contended
for defendant (i) that there was no
publication by defendant; (2) or no
publication within the State. The
second point was overruled, and as to
the first, it was held that the delivery of
the manuscript to be printed, was a publication, although a delivery to a wife, in
confidence, would not be a publication,
yet, in the case then before the Court,
the wife acted as the agent of her husband, and her delivery of the pamphlets
amounted to a publication by the defendant.' (3rd e.l., p. 146, n.)
"We think it our duty to hold that,
according to a well recognized principle, husband and wife are in the same
position, and therefore, that the uttering
of a libel by a husband to his wife, is
no publication, in ca.es apart from the
Married Woman's Property Act."
The eavesdropping witness did not
figure in this English case, but her actions were not considered by the California Court, in re-establishing the principle of confidential relations between
husband and wife.
When Mr. Commissioner HAYNE
wrote the first opinion in this case,
page 271, ank, he relied upon Schenck

v. Schenck (1843), 2o N. J. L. 208,
as establishing, with other authorities,
that there was a publication. That
decision was rendered by HORNBLOWER, C. J., in the Supreme Court
of New Jersey, upon a rule to. set
aside a verdict, and the following extract from the opinion conveys all the
law in point: "Secondly, whether a
sealed letter,addressed to the plaintiffs
wife and handed to her, unopened, was
such apublication as the law requires
to constitute a libel. But, upon these
points, I have no doubt. A man may
slander, or libel, another as effectually,
by circulating rumors or reports, or by
putting his communication, spoken or
written, in the shape of hearsays, as by
making distinct assertions of the slanderous matter and giving them out as
truths within his own knowledge, or for
the accuracy of which he pledges his
own veracity. The only difference is,
the latter class of calumniators are
rather the more honorable of the two,
if any comparison can be made between
such characters."
" Nor have I any doubt but that a
sealed letter, or other communication,
delivered to a wife, is a publication,
within the meaning of* the law. A
slander, uttered or published abroad,
may never reach the ears, or eyes, of
wife or children. But such a communication, made directly to the wife, is an
attempt to poison the fountains of domestic peace, conjugal affection and
filial obedience, at their very sources."
The decision now rendered by the
Supreme Court of California rightly
points out that another principle was
also involved.
The other case relied upon [ IVen.
man v. Ash (1853), 13 Q. B. 8362. is
essentially the -same case and decided
upon essentially the same grounds.
The case of Stak4v. Shoemaker was
decided by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, a few days (December 18,
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1888), after the principal case. It was
an appeal from a judgment, entered
upon a verdict of guilty on an indictment for slander. The accused, with
his wife, was running towards the prosecutrix, and, when about forty steps
distant, halted and shook his fist at the
prosecutrix and said--" Yes, there is
another damned negro whore, who will
go to town to-morrow, and get out another warrant against me." The Court
held that the words spoken, unquestionably amounted to a charge of incontinency, within 1113 of the Code, and
then considered the effect of their utterance in the presence of the wife as a
publication. DAvis, J., said-" It is
further insisted by the defendant, that
the ' legal entity' of the wife being
merged, ' husband and wife are one
person,' and therefore words spoken
by the husband, in the presence of the
wife, are protected; and ' assuming
that the supposed defamatory words
were spoken in the hearing of a third
person,' the wife is not such a person,
Iwithin the meaning of the law; and, if
she were such a third person, the fact
that she was 'a short distance off,' is
not sufficient to prove that she heard
the defamatory words. We are unable
to see the force of this objection. The
words spoken were not of a gentle and
confidential character between husband
and wife, but spoken in a loud tone,
which could have been heard a long
way off; and besides, it appears from
the testimony on behalf of the defendant, that a negro woman was near, and
that the witness, John Lytle, was in
hearing, though he testified that the
language used by the defendant was
different from that charged by the prosecutruxc."
The judgment was affirmed. This
language would seem to introduce the
eavesdropping witness again, by laying
stress upon the cliaracter and tone of
the utterances. This Court will proba-

bly not go so far, where the scene would
be amongst the privacies of home.
A review of the recent cases arising
from statutory changes in the relation of
husband and wife, discloses no breaking down of this salutary principle of
the common law, whereby husband and
wife were considered ag one unit. A
few instances will suffice.
In Illinois (Tler v. &nelwrn, April
5, 1889), the Supreme Court adhered
to the common law doctrine, by declaring a sale made to the wife of an agent,
without the knowledge of the land-"
owner, was fraudulent in law, though
not in fact under the circumstances of
the case, SCHOLFIELD, J., saying" Such a sale, at common law, would
clearly have been voidable, both because the wife there had no independent power to contract, and because the
husband would have taken an estate
during coverture, in the property. See
I Shars. B1. Comm. 44i, 442; Reeves,
Dorm. Rel. (2d ed.), 98, 99, and also
Id. 28. ** ** In our opinion, the
policy of the law equally prohibits the
wife of the agent, as it does the agent
himself, from taking title to the property which is the subject of his agency,
without the knowledge and express consent of the principal."
In this case, BAILEY, J., and CAL.tG,

C. J., dissented, the former thus expressing the views of both-" The purchaser
here was not the agent, but another
person [the wife], who was suijuris,
and capable of acquiring, owning, and
controlling her separate property,
wholly independent of any control or
interference on the part of her husband.
The opinion treats the purchase by the
wife as being the same in legal effect as
though made by the husband. This,
doubtless, would be the case, if the wife
were still laboring under the disabilities
imposed by the rules of the common
law. But our statute has so far emancipated her from those disabilities, as to
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place her, in all essential respects, in
the same legal position, so far as property rights are concerned, as though she
were afeme sole. * * * * * I canndt,
therefore, yield assent to the proposition, that, as the law stands, the wife of
an agent must, as a matter of law, be
held to be subject to the same legal incapacity to become the purchaser of the
property, which is the subject matter of
the agency, as is the agent himself.
Whether a purchase by her is to be
treated as fraudulent, and therefore
voidable at the instance of the vendor,
must, in my opinion, depend upon the
circumstances, and such purchase therefore, presents a question of fraud in
fact, and not of fraud in law. I do not
question that the relation between the
agent and the purchaser, whether as
husband and wife, or otherwise, is a
circumstance to be considered, in connection with other evidence, whenever
fraud in fact is charged."
In Michigan, where the court were
strongly of the opinion that the husband had burned his wife's store, still a
verdict in favor of the wife, against the
insurance company was sustained by
denying the motion for a new trial,
BROWN, J., saying-" While the facts
were such as to excite a grave suspicion
of the wife's connivance, they were not
such as to legally entitle this defence to
be presented to the jury. There can be
no question of the legal proposition,
that the wife is not chargeable with the
fraudulent conduct of her husband, notwithstanding he may have been her
agent in the management of the property and the conduct of her business."
Plinsky v. Gernania F. &, Af. ns.
Co., U. S. Cir. Ct. E. Dist. Mich., January 1I, 1887, 32 Fed. Repr. 47.
In Mississippi, on a creditor's bill to,
subject a wife's recentlypurckasedproperty to the busband's past debts, HILL,
J., said-" Our statute completely emancipates married women from all marital

disabilities as to their personal rights
and liabilities. * * * * It often happens that friends of ihe wife are willing
to aid her in procuring the means of
support for herself and family, in case
of the inability of her husband to do
so, * * * * and this with the expectation that she will be aided in the manage4ient of her business, by her husband, whose *firstduty is to provide for
the support of his wife and children,
including the education of his children.
This may well be done without any
fraud or injury to the husband's creditors, provided the husband does not reserve to himself any interest in the
property, or the income of the business,
beyond his own support and necezsary
personal expenses. There is no obligation upon his wife, to support and
maintain him, so long as he is able,"
that is, as against his creditors, "by his
own labor, to support himself :" FrankentAal v. Gilbert, U. S. Cir. Ct. S. Dist.
Miss., January x888, 34 Fed. Repr. 5,7.
In Wisconsin (Lane v. Duchae,
March 12, x889), where a mortgagewas
made to a married voman, in her
maiden name, L.Ym, J., said-" It is
not true that a fictitious payee and
mortgagee is named in the note and
mortgage. Barbara M. Rhyner is not a
fictitious person, but a person in esse.
True, since her marriage, she is entitled
to the name of her husband, Zentner,
but we are aware of no law that will
invalidate obligations and conveyances
executed by her, and to her, in her baptismal name, if she chooses to give, or
take, them in that form."
Without entering upon the qudstion
of confidential communications, a few
instances are subjoined to show the nature of such a communication, in the
light of the principal case.
In Indiana, the wife was allowed to
testify to her husband's intoxicated condition, when lie came to her father's
house: Stanley v. Stanley (1887), 1z
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Ind. 143. But MITCHELL, J., was care-

ful to say--" The husband's condition,
as to being intoxicated, unless it should
appear to have been specially confided
to the wife in the absence of others,
cannot be regarded as in the nature of
a confidential communication."
In the same State, when the wife was
allowed to prove by her own oath, that
she had authorized her husband to act
as her agent, MORRIS, C., said-" The

object of the Statute of 1879 (Acts of
1879, p. 245), was not to impose additional restrictions as to the disclosure of
communications between husband and
wife, but to continue the law as it has
long existed upon the subject. The
authority given by the wife, to the husband, to transact her business, is not
confidential nor intended to be private.
Such authority may be in writing, or

may be verbal. It is intended to be
known, and would be worthless unless
known :" Schmied v. Frank (X832),
86 Ind. 250, 258.
In Ma'sachu.,etts (Comm v. Jardine,
1887, 143 Mass. 567), a married woman
has been allowed to testify to complaints
of pain and suffering in limbs and body,
by her husband, after an assault. The
enquiry called for nothing more, and,
therefore, she was not testifying to anything confidential or private.
In Vermont, the wife of one party to,
a contract was the only means of communication between the parties in making the contract. She was allowed totestify in favor of the husband, on the
ground of being the agent of both parties: Mfartin v. Hurlbert (t888), 6o,
Vt. 364.
JOHN B. UHLL

Supreme Court of the United States.
CENTRAL NATIONAL BANK OF WASHINGTON CITY v.HUME.
HUME v. CENTRAL NATIONAL BANK.
An insolvent debtor may insure his life for the benefit of his wife and children
and pay the premiums out of his own earnings, without rendering the proceeds of
such insurance liable for the claims of his creditors.
The payment of the premiums for such insurance is not equivalent to a transfer
of property with intent to hinder, delay and defraud creditors, such as would be
fraudulent and void under the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, c. 5.
Semble,per FULLER, C. J.," that. should an insolvent debtor pay large premiums out of all reasonable proportion to his known or reputed financial condition, and under circumstances of grave suspicion which might justify the inference of fraud on creditors in the withdrawal of such an amount from the debtor's
resources, his creditors would be entitled upon his death to receive from the insurance money the amount of the premiums thus paid; but in such case both the
beneficiary named in the policy and the insurer must be shown to have participated in the fraudulent intent.

Appeals from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
On the 2 3 d of April, 1872, in consideration of an annual
premium of $230.89, the Life Insurance Company of Virginia
VOL. XXXVII.-27
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issued at Petersburgh, in that commonwealth, a policy of insurance on the life of Thomas L. Hume, of Washington. D.
C., for the term of his natural life, in the sum of $Io,ooo, for
the, sole use and benefit of his wife, Annie Graham Hume, and
his children, payment to be madc. to them, their heirs, execu.tors, or assigns, at Petersburgh, Virginia.
The charter of the company provided as follows:
Any policy of insurance issued by the Life Insurance Company of Virginia on
the: life of any person, expressed to be for the benefit of any married woman,
whether the same be effected originally by herself or her husband, or by any other
person, or whether the premiums thereafter be paid by herself or her husband or
any other person as aforesaid, shall enure for her sole and separate use and benefit
and that of her husband's children, if any, as maybe expressed in said policy,and
shall be held by her free from the control or claim of her husband or his creditors,
or of the person effecting the same and his creditors. (Sec. 7.)

The application for this policy was made on behalf of the
wife and children by Thomas L. Hume, who signed the same
for them.
The premium of $230.89 was reduced by annual dividends
of $34.71 to $196.18, which sum was regularly paid on the
23 d of April, 1872, and each year thereafter, up to and including the 23 d of April, 188I.
On the 28th of March, 188o, the Hartford Life and Annuity
Company of Hartford, Connecticut, issued five certificates of
insurance upon the life of Thomas L. Hume, of $i,ooo each,
payable at Hartford to his wife, Annie G. Hume, if living, but
otherwise to his legal representatives. Upon each of these
certificates a premium of ten dollars was paid upon their issuance, amounting in all to $50, and thereafter certain other
sums, amounting at the time of the death of Hume to $41.25.
On the 17th of February, 1881, the Maryland Life Insur
ance Company of Baltimore issued, at Baltimore, a policy of
insurance upon the life of Thomas L. Hume, in the sum of
$.6,ooo,
for the term of his natural life, payable in the city o"
Baltimore to "the said insured, Annie G. Hume, for her sole
use, her executors, administrators, or assigns"; the said policy
being issued, as it recites on its face, in consideration of the
sum of $337.20 to them duly paid by said Annie G. Hume,
and of an annual premium of the same amount to be paid each
.year. during the continuance" of the policy.. The application

CENTRAL NATIONAL BANK V. HUME.

for this policy was signed " Annie G. Hume, by Thomas L.
Hume," as is a recognized usage in such applications and in
accordance with instructions to that effect printed upon the
policy.
The charter of the Maryland Life Insurance Company provides as follows:
Section 17. That it shall be lawful for any married woman, by herself or in her
name or in the name of any third person, with his consent, as her trustee, to be
caused to be insured in said company, for her sole use, the life of her husband, for
any definite period or for the term of his natural life, and in case of her surviving
her husband the sum or net amount of the insurance shall be payable to her to
and for her own use, free from the claims of the representatives of her husband or
of any of his creditors. In case of the death of the wife before the decease of
ihe husband, the amount of the insurance may be made payable, after the death of
the husband, to her children, or, if under age, to their guardian, for their use; in
the event of there being no children, she may have power to devise, and if dying
intestate, thcn to go [to] the next of kin.

The directions printed on the margin of the policy called
especial attention to the provisions of the charter upon this
subject, an extract from which was printed on the fourth page
of the application.
The amount of premium paid on this
policy was $242.26, a loan having been deducted from the full
premium of $337.20.
On the I 3 th of June,. 1881, the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, of Hartford, in consideiation of an annual
premium of $350.30, to be paid before the day of its date, issued a policy of insurance upon the life of Thomas L. Hume,
.in the sum of $I0,OOO, for the term of.his natural life, payable
at Hartford to Annie G. Hume and her children by him, or
their legal representatives. The application for this policy was
signed "Annie G. Hume, by Thomas L Hume." It was expressly provided, as part of the contract, that the policy was
issued and delivered at Hartford, in the State of Connecticut,
and was "to be in all respects construed and determined in
accordance with the laws of that State."
The "statute of Connecticut respecting policies of insurance
issued for the benefit of married women" was printed upon
the policy under that heading, and is as follows:
Any policy of life insurance expressed to be for the benefit of a married
woman, or assigned to her or in trust for her, shall inure to her separate use, or, in
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case of her decease before payment, to the use of her children or of her husband's
children, as may Le provided in such policy. Provided, That, if the annual promium on such policy shall exceed three hundred dollars, the amount of such excess, with interest, shall inure to the benefit of the creditors of the person paying
the premiums. but if she shall die before the person insured, leaving no children
of herself or husband, the policy ,hall become the property of the person who has
paid the premiums, unless otherwise provided in such policy.

And this extract from the statute was printed upon the
policy and attention directed thereto. From the $350.30 premium the sum of $Io5 was deducted, to be charged against
the policy in accordance with its terms, with interest, and
$245.30 was therefore the sum paid.
The American Life Insurance Company of Philadelphia had
also issued a policy in the sum of $ .ooo on the life of Hume,
payable to himself or his personal representatives, and this
was collected by his administrators.
Thomas L. Hume died at Washington on the 23 d of October, I88I, insolvent, his widow Annie G. Hume and six minor
children surviving him.
November 2d, I88i, the Central National Bank of Washington, as the holder of certain promissory notes of Thomas
L. Hume, amounting to several thousand dollars, filed a bill in
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against Mrs.
Hume and the Maryland Life Insurance Company, alleging
that the policy issued by the latter was procured while Hume
was insolvent; that Hume paid the premium of $242.26 without complainant's knowledge or consent, and for the purpose
of hindering, delaying, and defrauding the complainant and
his other creditors; and praying for a restraining order on the
insurance company from paying to, and Mrs. Hume from receiving, either for herself or children, the amount due pending
thesuit, and "that the amount of the said insurance policy may
be decreed to be assets of said Thomas L. Hutrme, applicable
to the payment of debts owing by him at his death," etc. The
temporary injunction was granted.
On the 12th of November, the insurance company filed its
answer to the effect that Mrs. Hume obtained the insurance in
her own name, and was entitled under the policy to the amount
thereof, and setting up and relying upon the 17 th section of its
charter, quoted above. Mrs. Hume answered, November 16,
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declaring that she applied for and procured the policy in question, and that it was not procured with fraudulent intent; that
the estate of her father, A. H. Pickrell, who died in 1879, was
the largest creditor of Hume's estate; that she is her father's
residuary legatee ; that the amount of the policy was intended
not only to provide for her, but also to secure her against loss;
that her mother had furnished Hume with about a thousand
dollars annually to be used for her best interests and that of
his wife and children ; and that the premium paid on the policy
in question and those paid on other policies, was and were
paid out of money belonging to her father's estate, or out of
the money of her mother applied as directed and requested by
the latter.
Benjamin U. Keyser, receiver, holding unpaid notes of Hume,
was allowed, by order of court, November I6, 188i, to intervene as co-complainant in the cause.
R. Ross Perry and Reginald Fendall were appointed, November 26, i88i, Hume's administrators.
On January 23, 1882, the administrators filed three bills (and
obtained injunctions) against Mrs. Hume and each of the other
insurance companies, attacking each of the policies (except the
American) as a fraudulent transfer by an insolvent of assets
belonging to his crelitors.
The answers of Mrs. Hume were substantially the same
mutatis mutandis as above given, and so were the answers of
the Connecticut Mutual and the Virginia Life, the former
pleading the statute of Connecticut as part of its policy, and
the latter the seventh section of its charter.
The Hartford Life and Annuity Company did not answer,
and the bill to which it was a party defendant was taken pro
confesso.
The administrators were, by order of court, January 2, 1883,
admitted parties defendant.
January 4, 1883, the Court entered a decretal order, dissolving the restraining order in one case, and directing the Virginia Insurance Company to pay the amount due upon its
policy into court, and the clerk of the court to pay the same
over to Mrs. Hume, for her own benefit and as guardian of her
children (which was done accordingly), and continuing the
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injunctions in the other cases, but ordering the other insurance
companies to pay the amounts due into the registry of the
court.
By order of Court, January 30, 1883, the Farmers' and
Mechanics' National Bank of Georgetown, which had proved
up a large claim against Hume's estate, was allowed to intervene as a co-complainant; and March i9, 1883, Gebrge W.
Cochran, a creditor, was by like order allowed to intervene as
co-complainant.
Replications were filed and testimony taken on both sides.
The evidence tended to show that Hume's financial condition as early as 1874 was such that if called upon to respond
on the instant he could not have met his liabilities, and that
this condition grew gradually worse until it culminated in
irretrievable ruin in the fall of 188i ; but it also indicates that
for several years, and up to October 2 1, I88I, two days before
his death, he was a partner in a going concern apparently of
capital and credit; that he had a considerable amount of real
estate, though most of it was heavily encumbered; that he
was an active business man, not personally extravagant; and
that he was, for two years prior to October, in receipt ol^
moneys from his wife's mother, who had an income from her
separate property.
He seems to have received from Mrs. Pickrell, or the estate
of Pickrell, his wife's father, of which Mrs. Hume was the
residuary legatee, over six thousand dollars in 1879, over three
thousand dollars in i88o, and over seventeen hundred dollars
in 1881.
Mrs. Pickrell's fixed income was one thousand dollars a year
from rents of her own property, which after the death of her
husband in May, 1879, was regularly paid over to Mr. Hume.
She testifies that she told Hume that "he could use all that I
[she] had for his own and his family's benefit, and that he could
use it for anything he thought best"; that she had out of it
herself from $200 to $25o a year from the death of Pickrell.
in May, 1879, to that of Hume, in October, 1881, and that before his death Mr. Hume informed his wife and herself that he
had insured his life for Mrs. Hume's benefit, but did not state
where the premium money came from.
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Blackford, agent for the Maryland Company, testified, under
objection, that Hume told him in February, I88I, that certain
means had been placed in his hands, to be invested for his wife
and children, and he had concluded to take $io,ooo in Blackford's agency, and should some months later take Sio,ooo in
the Connecticut Mutual. He accordingly took the $io,ooo in
the Maryland, and subsequently, during the summer, informed
Blackford that he had obtained the insurance in the Connecticut Mutual.
Evidence was also adduced that Mr. Hume was largely indebted to Pickrell's estate, by reason of endorsements of his
paper by Pickrell, and the use by him in raising money of securities belonging to the .latter, and that said estate is involved
in litigation and its ultimate value problematical.
The causes were ordered to be heard in the first instance at
a general term of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, which Court, after argument, on the 5th day of January,
1885, decreed that the administrators should recover all sums
paid by Thomas L. Hume as premiums on all said policies,
including those on the Virginia policy from 1874, and that
after deducting said premiums, the residue of the money paidinto Court (being that received from the Maryland and the
Connecticut Mutual) be paid to Mrs. Hume individually or as
guardian for herself and children, and that the Hartford Life
and Annuity Company pay over to her the amount due on the
certificates issued by it.
From this decree the said Central National Bank, Benjamin
U. Keyser, the Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank of
Georgetown, George W. Cochran, and the administrators, as
well as Mrs. Hume, appealed, and the cause came on to be
heard upon these cross-appeals.
Walter D. David-e, R. Ross Perry and Edwards & Barnard
for creditors and administrators; Enoch Totten and Gordon &
Gordon for Mrs. Hume and her children.
Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, November 12, 1888, (after stating
the facts as above):
No appeal whs prosecuted from the decree of January 4,
1883, directing the amount due upon the policy issued by the
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Life Insurance Company of Virginia to be paid over to Mrs.
Hume for her own benefit and as guardian of her children, nor
is any error now assigned to the action of the Court in that
regard. Indeed, it is conceded by counsel for the complainants, that this contract was perfectly valid as against the world,
but it is insisted that, assuming the proof to establish the insolvency of Hume in 1874 and thenceforward, the premiums
paid in that and the subsequent years on this policy belonged
in equity to the creditors, and that they were entitled to a decree therefor as well as for the amount of the Maryland and
Connecticut policies and the premiums paid thereon.
It is not denied that the contract of the Maryland Insurance
Company was directly between that company and Mrs. Hume,
and this is, in our judgment, true of that of the Connecticut
Mutual, while the Hartford Company's certificates were payable to her, if living.
Mr. Hume having been insolvent at the time the insurance
was effected, and having paid the premiums himself, it is argued
that these policies were within the provisions of 13 Elizabeth,
c. 5, and inure to the benefit of his creditors as equivalent to
transfers of property with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud.
The object of the statute of Elizabeth was to prevent debtors
from dealing with their property in any way to the prejudice
of their creditors; but dealing with that which creditors, irrespective of such dealing, could not have touched, is within
neither the letter nor the spirit of the statute. In the view of
the law, credit is extended in reliance upon the evidence of the
ability of the debtor to pay, and in confidence that his possessions will not be diminished to the prejudice of those who
trust him. This reliance is disappointed, and this confidence
abused, if he divests himself of his property by giving it away
after he has obtained credit. And where a person has taken
out policies of insurance upon his life for the benefit of his estate, it has been frequently held that, as against creditors, his
assignment, when insolvent, of such policies, to or for the benefit of wife and children, or either, constitutes a fraudulent
transfer ot assets within the statute, and this, even though the
debtor may have had no deliberate intention of depriving his
creditors of a fund to which they were entitled, because his act
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has in point of fact withdrawn such a fund from them, and
dealt with it by way of bounty. Freemanv. Pope (1 869), L. R.,
9 Eq. 2o6; s. c. (1870), L. R., 5 Ch. 538. The rule stands
upon precisely the same ground as any other disposition of his
property by the debtor. The defect of the disposition is that
it removes the property of the debtor out of the reach of his
creditors. Cornish v. Clark (1872), L. R., 14 Eq, 184.
But the rule applies only to that which the debtor could
have made available for payment of his debts. For instance,
the exercise of a general power of appointment might be
fraudulent and void under the statute, but not the exercise of
a limited or exclusive power, because, in the latter case, the
debtor never had any interest in the property himself which
could have been available to a creditor, or by which he could
have obtained credit. May on Fraudulent Conveyances, p. 33.
It is true that creditors can obtain relief in respect to a fraudulent conveyance where the grantor cannot, but that relief only
restores the subjection of the debtor's property to the payment
of his indebtedness as it existed prior to the conveyance.
A person has an insurable interest in his own life for the
benefit of his estate. The contract affords no compensation to
him, but to hiz representatives. So the creditor has an insurable interest in the debtor's life, and can protecthimself accordingly, if he so chooses. Marine and fire insurance is considered as strictly an indemnity; but while this is not so as to
life insurance, which is simply a contract, so far as the company is concerned, to pay a dertain sum of money upon the
occurrence of an event which is sure at some time to happen,
in consideration of the payment of the premiums as stipulated,
nevertheless the contract is also a contract of indemnity. If
the creditor insures the life of his debtor, he is thereby indemnified against the loss of his debt by the death of the debtor
before payment; yet, if the creditor keeps up the premiums,
and his debt is paid before the debtor's death, he may still recover upon the contract, which was valid when made, and which
the insurance company is bound to pay according to its terms;
but if the debtor obtains the insurance on the insurable interest
of the creditor, and pays the premiums himself, and the debt
is extinguished before the insurance falls in, then the proceeds
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would go to the estate of the debtor. Knox v. Turner (i870),
L. R.,9 Eq. 155.
The wife and children have an insurable interest in the life
of the husband and father, and if insurance thereon be taken
out by him and he pays the premiums and survives them, it
might be reasonably claimed in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, that the policy would inure to his estate.
In Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Palmer (1875), 42 Conn. 6o,
the wife insured the life of the husband, the amount insured to
be payable to her if she survived him, if not, to her children.
The wife and one son died prior to the husband, the son leaving a son surviving. The Court held that under the provisions of the statute of that State, the policy being made payable to the wife and children, the children immediately took
such a vested interest in the policy, that the grand-son was entitled to his father's share, the wife having died before the husband, but that in the absence of the statute "it would have
been a fund in the hands of his representatives for the benefit
of the creditors, provided the premiums had been paid by
him." So in the case of Anderson's E-state, Hay's and Kerr's
Appeal (1877), 85 Pa. 202. A. insured his life in favor of his
wife, who died intestate in his lifetime, leaving an only child.
A. died intestate and insolvent, the child surviving, and the
Court held that the proceeds of the policy belonged to the
wife's estate, and, under the intestate laws, was to be distributed share and share alike between her child and her husband's estate, notwithstanding, under a prior statute, life insurance taken out for the wife vested in her free from the claims
of the husband's creditors. But if the wife had survived she
would have taken the entire proceeds.
We think it cannot be doubted that in the instance of contracts of insurance with a wife or children, or both, upon their
insurable interest in the life of the husband or father, the latter,
while they are living, can exercise no power of disposition over
the same without their consent, nor has he any interest therein
of which he can avail himself, nor upon his death have his
personal representatives or his creditors any interest in the
proceeds of such contracts, which belong to the beneficiaries
to whom they are payable.
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It is indeed the general rule that a policy, and the money to
become due under it, belong, the moment it is issued, to the
person or persons named in it as the beneficiary or beneficia
ries, and that there is no power in the person procuring the
insurance, by any act of his, by deed or by will, to transfer to
any other person the interest of the person named. Bliss on
Life Insurance, 2d ed., p. 517 ; Glan.- v. Gloeckler (1881), io
Bradw. (Ill.), 486, per MCALLISTER, J.; s. c. (1882), 104 Ill.
573; Wilburn v. Wilburn (1882), 83 Ind. 55 ; Ricker v. Charter
Oak Life Ins. Co. (1880), 27 Minn. 193; Charte, Oak zife Ins.
Co.v. Brant (1871), 47 Mo. 419; Gouldv. Emerson (I868), 99
Mass. 154; Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Pett (1868), Id. 157
This must ordinarily be so where the contract is directly
with the beneficiary; in respect to policies running to the person insured, but payable to another having a direct pecuniary
interest in the life insured; and where the proceeds are made
to enure by positive statutory provisions.
Mrs. Hume was confessedly a contracting party to the Maryland policy; and as to the Connecticut contracts, the statute
of the State where they were made and to. be performed, explicitly provided that a policy for the benefit of a married
woman shall enure to her separate use or that of her children,
but if the annual premium exceed three hundred dollars, the
amount of such excess shall enure to the creditors of the per-.
son paying the premiums.
The rights and benefits given by the laws of Connecticut in
this regard are as much part of these contracts as if incorporated therein, not only because they are to be taken as if entered
into there, but because there was the place of performance, and
the stipulation of the parties was made with reference to the
laws of that place.
And if this be so as between Hume and the Connecticut
companies, then he could not have at any time disposed of
these policies without the consent of the beneficiary. Nor is
there anything to the contrary in the statutes or general public
policy of the District of Columbia.
It may very well be that a transfer by an insolvent of a Connecticut policy, payable to himself or his personal representatives, would be held invalid in the District, even though valid
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under the laws of Connecticut, if the laws of the District were
opposed to the latter, because the positive laws of the domicile
and the forum must prevail; but there is no such conflict of
laws in this case in respect to the power of disposition by a
person procuring insurance payable to another.
The obvious distinction between the transfer of a policy
taken out by a person upon his insurable interest in his own
life. and payable to himself or his legal representatives, and the
obtaining of a policy by a person upon the insurable interest
of his wife and children, and payable to them, has been repeatedly recognized by the courts.
Thus, in Elliott's Appeal(I865), 50 Pa. 75, where the policies
were issued in the name of the husband, and payable to himself or his personal representative, and while he was insolvent
were by him transferred to trustees for his wife's benefit, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, while holding such transfers
void as against creditors, say:
We are to be understood in thus deciding this case that we do not mean to extend it to policies effected without fraud, directly and on their face for the benefit
of the wife, and payable to her; such policies are not fraudulent'as to creditors,
and are not touched by this decision.

In the use of the words "without fraud," the Court evidently
means actual fraud participated in by all parties, and not fraud
inferred from the meie fact of insolvency; and, at all events, in
McCutcheon's Appeal (I88 I), 99 Pa. 133, the Court say, refer-

ring to Elliott's Appeal:
The policies in that case were effected in the name of the husband, and by him
transferred to a trustee for his wife at a time when he was totally insolvent. They
were held to be valuable choses in action, the property of the assured, liable to the
payment of his debts, and hence their voluntary assignment operated in fraud of
creditors, and was void as against them under the statute of 13th Elizabeth. Here.
however, the policy was effected in the name of the wife, and in point of fact wagiven under an agreement for the surrender of a previous policy for the same
amount also issued in the wife's name .......
The question of good faith or fraud only arises in the latter case; that is, when
the title of the beneficiary arises by assignment. When it exists by force of an
original issue in the name, or for the benefit of the beneficiary, the title is good
There is no anomaly in this,
notwithstanding the claims of creditors ........
nor any conflict with the letter or spirit of the statute of Elizabeth, because in such
cases the policy would be at no time the property of the assured, and hence n,.
question of fraud in its transfer could arise as to his creditors. It is only in the
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case of an assignment of a policy that once belonged to the assured that the question
of fraud can arise under this act.

And see .Etna National Bank v. U. S. Life Ins. Co. (1885),
Repr. 770; Pence v. .fMakepeace (879), 65 Ind. 345;
Succession of Zlaring (I874),.26 La. An. 326; Stigler's Ex'r v.
Stigler (1883), 77 Va. 163; Thompson v. Cundiff (1875), 11
Bush (Ky.) 567.
Conceding, then, in the case in hand, that Hume paid the
premiums out of his own money, when insolvent, yet, as Mrs.
Hume and the children survived him, and the contracts covered their insurable interest, it is difficult to see upon what
ground the creditors, or the administrators as representing
them, can take away from these dependent ones that which was
expressly secured to them in the event of the death of their
natural supporter. The interest insured was neither the debtor's nor his creditors'. The contracts were not payable to the
debtor, or his representatives, or his creditors. No fraud on
the part of the wife, or the children, or the insurance company,
is pretended. In no sense was there any gift or transfer of the
debtor's property, unless the amounts paid as premiums are to
be held to constitute such gift or transfer. This seems to have
been the view of the court below, for the decree awarded to
the complainants the premiums paid to the Virginia company
from 1874 to i88i, inclusive, and to the other companies from
the date of the respective policies, amounting, with interest to
January 4, 1883, to the sum of $2,696.io, which sum was
directed to be paid to Hume's administrators out of the money
which had been paid into court by the Maryland and Connecticut Mutual companies.
But, even though Hume paid this money out of his own
funds when insolvent, and if such payment were within the
statute of Elizabeth, this would not give the creditors any
interest in the proceeds of the policies, which belonged to the
beneficiaries for the reasons already stated.
Were the creditors, .then, entitled to recover the premiums?
These premiums were paid by Hume to the insurance companies, and to recover from them would require proof that the
latter participated in the alleged fraudulent intent, which is not
claimed. Cases might be imagined of. the payment of large
24 Fed.
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premiums, out of all reasonable proportion to the known or
reputed financial condition of the person paying, and under
circumstances of grave suspicion, which might justify the inference of fraud on creditors in the withdrawal of such an amount
from the debtor's resources; but no element of that sort exists
here.
The premiums form no part of the proceeds of the policies,
and cannot be deducted therefrom on that ground.
Mrs. Hume is not shown to have known of her husband's
insolvency, and if the payments were made at her instance, or
with her knowledge and assent, or if, without her knowledge,
she afterwards ratified the act, and claimed the benefit, as she
might rightfully do (Thompson v. American Ins. Co. (1871), 46
N. Y. 674), and as she does (and the same remarks apply to
the children), then has she thereby received money which ex
&,quoet bono she ought to return to her husband's creditors,
and can the decree against her be sustained on that ground?
If, in some cases, payments of premiums might be treated as
gifts .inhibited by the statute of Elizabeth, can they be so treated
here?
It is assumed by complainants that the money paid was derived from Hume himself, and it is therefore argued that to that
extent his means for payment of debts were impaired. That
the payments contributed in any appreciable way to Hume's
insolvency is not contended. So far as premiums were paid in
I88o and IN8I (the payments prior to those years having been
the annual sum of $ 19 6.18 on the Virginia policy), we are satisfied from the evidence that Hume received from Mrs. Pickrell,
his wife's mother, for the benefit of Mrs. Hume and her family,
an amount of money largely in excess, of these payments, after
deducting what was returned to Mrs. Pickrell, and that in paying the premiums upon procuring the policies in the Maryland
and the Connecticut Mutual, Hume was appropriating to that
purpose a part of the money which he considered he thus held
in trust, and we think that, as between Hume's creditors and
Mrs. Hume, the money placed in Hume's hands for his wife's
benefit is, under the evidence, equitably as much to be accounted
for to her by Hume, and so by them, as is the money paid on
her account to be accounted for by.her to him or them.
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We do not, however, dwell particularly upon this, nor pause
to discuss the bearing of the laws of the States of the insurance
companies upon this matter of the payment of premiums by
the debtor himself, so far as they may differ from the rule which
may prevail in the District of Columb-a, in the absence of specific statutory enactment upon that subject, because we prefer
to place our decision 4upon broader grounds.
In all purely voluntary conveyances it is the fraudulent intent
of the donor which vitiates. If actually insolvent, he is held
to knowledge of his condition; and if the necessary consequence of his act is to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors,
within the statute, the presumption of the fraudulent intent is
irrebuttable and conclusive, and inquiry into his motives is
inadmissible.
But the circumstances of each particular case should be considered, as in Partridgev.Gopp (1758), I Eden 163; s. c. Ambl.
595, where the Lord Keeper, while holding that debts must be
paid before gifts are made, and debtors must be just before they
are generous, admitted that "the fraudulent intent might be
collected from the magnitude and value of the gift."
Where fraud is to be imputed, or the imputation of fraud
repelled, by an examination into the circumstances under which
a gift is made to those towards whom the donor is under
natural obligation, the test is said, in Kipp v. Hanna (1829), 2
Bland (Md.) 33, to be the pecuniary ability of the donor at that
time to withdraw the amount of the donation from his estate
without the least hazard to his creditors, or in any material
degree lessening their then prospects of payment; and in considering the sufficiency of the debtor's property for the payment
of debts, the probable, immediate, unavoidable, and reasonable
demands for the support of the family of the donor should be
taken into the account and deducted, having in mind also the
nature of his business and his necessary expenses: Emerson v.
Bemis (1873), 69 Ill. 537.
This argument in the interest of creditors concedes that the
debtor may rightfully preserve his family from suffering and
want. It seems to us that the same public policy which justifies this, and recognizes the support of wife and children as a
positive obligation in law as well as morals, should be extended
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to protect them from destitution after the debtor's death, by
permitting him, not to accumulate a fund as a permanent provision, but to devote a moderate portion ofhis earnings to keep
on foot a security for support already, or which could thereby
be, lawfully obtained, at least to the extent of requiring that,
under such circumstances, the fraudulent intent of both parties to
the transaction should be made out.
And inasmuch as there is no evidence from which such intent
on the part of Mrs. Hume or the insurance companies could
be inferred, in our judgment none of these premiums can be
recovered.
The decree is affirmed, except so far as it directs the payment to the administrators of the premiums in question and
interest, and, as to that, is reversed, and the cause remanded
to the court below, With directions to proceed in conformity
with this opinion.
Ordered accordingly.
In the earliest case upon the subject
tween the cases of a policy issued originally in favor of the husband, and as(Grogan v. Cooke (1812), 2 Ball &B.
signed by him, and a policy issued in
230), Lord MANNaas expressed a doubt
the first instance, as in the principal
whether the transfer of policies of incase, to the wife, child or other desurance could be considered as fraudupendent relative as beneficiary. This
lent and covinous, within the meaning
of the statute of Elizabeth. But the distinction is broadly recognized in EllioN's AAjpeal , stpra, and in the later
law in England has been settled otherPennsylvania case of McCutcheon'sApwise, and the courts have in a number
of cases set aside assignments of insur- peal(i881),99 Pa. 133, in the language
quoted by the Chief Justice on page
ance policies to members of the insured's
family, as being in fraud of creditors:
428, su2Pra. In England the right of
a wife to the proceeds of policies, isStokoe v. Cowan (i861), 29 Beav. 637 ;
sued in her favor upon her husband's
Penhallv. Elwin (1853), x Sm.& G.
life, although the premiums may have
258; Jenkyn v. Vaughan (1856), 3
been paid by him, is now protected
Drew. 419; Freeman v. Pope (z869),
by statute against the claims of big'
L. R. 9 Eq. 2o6; Taylor v. Coenen
creditors. The original English Stat(1876), L. R. i Ch. D. 636. In the
ute securing this right (Act of x870,
United States such assignments have
33 and 34 Vict., Ch. 93, Sec. io), has
also been held to be void as against
been superseded by the Act of 1882, 45
creditors: Catchingsv.Manlove (I86i),
and 46 Vict., Ch. 75, Sec. 11, which
39 Miss. 655; Elliott's 4I~eal (1865),
5o Pa. 75; Stokes v. Coffey (1872), 8
provides that "a policy of assurance efBush (Ky.) 533; Buton v. Farinhol fected by any man on his own life; and
expressed to be for the benefit of his
(z882), 86 N. C. 26o.
But there is amarked distinction bewife, or of his children, or of his wife
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and children, or any of them, shall
create a trust in favir of the objects
therein named, and the moneys payable
under any such policy shall not, so long
as any object of the trust remains unperformed, form part of the estate of the
insured, or be subject to his deLts; provdded, that if it shall be proved that the
policy was effected and the premiums
paid with intent to defraud the creditors
of the insured, they shall lFe entitled to
receive, out of the moneys payable
under the policy, a sum equal to the
premiumsso paid." A similar provision
is made as to policies taken out upon
the life of the wife in favor of husband
or children, and the appointment of a
trustee to receive the insurance money
is authorized. Prior to these aits a
policy in favor of wife or children would
have been held fraudulent in England,
as against creditors: 1French v. J,)-encl
(1855), 6 De G. M. & G. 95 ; 11C/1 v.
E'erall (1876), L. R. 2 Ch. D. 266.
In almost all the States of this country
the same protection has been given by
legislative enactment, and in one by
constitutional provision. The Constitution of ort/h Carolinaprovides (Art.
io, Sec. 7): "The husband may insure
his own life for the sole use and benefit
of his wife and children, and in case of
the death of the husband the amount
thus insured shall be paid over to the
wife and childien, * * * free from all
the claims of the representatives of the
husband, or any of his creditors." This
provision does not apply to an assignment by a husband to his wife of a
policy originally issued to him, such
as.ignment being void as against his
creditors: Burton v. Farinholt(882),
86 N. C 260.

The Code of A/alaama, Vol. x, See.
2356, provides: "'I he wife, in her own
name, or in the name of a trustee, may
insure the life of her husband for the
benefit of herself, or for the benefit of
herself and any child or children of the
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marriage. Or the husband or fath r
may insure his life for the benefit of his
wife, or for the benefit of his wife and
children, or for the benefit of his minor
child or children, and such insurance is
exempt from liability for his debts or
engagements, or for his torts, or any
penalty or damages recoverable of him,
if the annual premiums do not exceed
$5oo; or, if such premiums exceed
s5oo, then to the extent of the insurance which an annual premium of $5oo
would purchase."
Under this statute, the proceeds of an
insurance 1-olicy in excess of the amount
wthich could be purchased by an annual
premium of $5oo, constitute a fund for
the payment of the insured's del ts :
Stone v. A'nickerbocker L6fe Ins. Co.
(1875), 52 Ala. 589. The statute is in
the nature of an exemption law and
must be construed liberally: Felrath v.
Sc/onflcd (1884), 76 Id. 199. But a
policy in favor of one only of several
children is not protected: Fearn v.
Mard (t88o), 65 Id. 33.
Arkans,.s (Dig. Stat. I884, Sec.
4623) gives the wife, with her husband's
assent, the right to insure, or cause to
be insured, his lile, the proceeds to go
to her, or, in the event of her not survivng her husband, to her children,
fiee from the claims of creditors, but
provides that "such exemption shall not
apply where the amount of premium
annually paid out of the fund- or property of the husband sliall exceed the
sum of $300.

'

In California, by the Code of Civil
Procedure, Sec. 69o, "all moneys, benefits, pri'.ileges or immunities accruing,

or in any manner growing out of, a y
life insurance on the life of the debtor,
if the annual premiums do not exceed "
$ 5oo, are exempted from liability for
the debts of the insured," and, I y Sec.
3470, it is provided that insurance upon
the life of an as-ignee sl...ll ot pass
by an assignment for the lxnefit of
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right to insure her husband's life, free
from the claims of creditors, except
when the annual premium exceeds $15o.
The Forida statute (McClellan's
Dig., Ch. 104, Sec. 22) is most sweeping in its terms, providing that " whenever any person shall die in this S:ate,
leaving insurance upon his or her life,
the said insurance shall inure exclusively to the benefit of his or her child
lough (1869), 36 Cal. 542.
or children, husband or wife, in equal
In Colorado there is no statute affectportions, or ta any oth-r person or pering the question under consideration,
sons for whose use or benefit said inand in Goodrich v. Treat (IS77), 3
surance is declared in the policy, and
Colo. 4o8, it was expressly left undetermined by the Supreme Court of that the proceeds thereof shall in no case
be liable to * * * creditors of the erState.
son whose life was so insured, unless
The Conne,'khut statute (Gen. Stat.
said policy declares that said insurance
1888, Sec. 2799) is quoted in full in the
was effected for the benefit of such credreport of the principal case on pages
itor or creditors."
419-20, sptra.
By this statute a policy, written "for
Under this statute, where a married
the benefit of the estate of the insured,"
-woman made an assignment of it policy
at once inured to the benefit of his
Adon the life of her husband, which was
only child, his wife being dead, and no
[payable to her, and, in case of her not
interest in the policy passed to his
surviving her husband, to her children,
assignee in bankruptcy: "Pace v. Pace
but died before her husband, it was held
(1882), 19 Fla. 438. And where two
that the children's interest was not afpolicies were made payable to the infected by the assignment; and a doubt
sured, and he subsequently, not being
was expressed whether a valid assignindebted, placed on each a direction to
ment could be made under any circumstances: Connecticut Afut. Life Ins. pay the proceeds to a particular person,
such direction was valid as against the
Co. v. Burroughs(1867), 34 Conn. 305.
claims of subsequent creditors: EpWhere a similar policy, after the wife's
death, was surrendered by the husband, pinger v. Canpa (I883), 20 Id. 262.
The Georgia Code, Sec. 2820, proand a policy for his own benefit substivides that "the assured may direct the
tuted, the children were awarded the
money to be paid to his personal repreinsurance money, in spite of the claims
sentative, or to his widow, or to his
of creditors: Chapinv. Fellowes (x869),
36Id. 132. A policy substituted in the children, or to his assignee ; and upon
such direction, given and assented to by
same manner for one in favor of the
the insurer, no other person can defeat
insured's betrothed, without her knowledge or consent, and assigned to a the same."
In Rawson v. Jones (1874), 52 Ga.
creditor, still belonged to the original
beneficiary, and she was entitled to its 458, this provision is recognized as protecting a policy in favor of wife or
proceeds, less the amount of premiums
paid by the creditor: Lemon v. Phomilr children from the claims of creditors.
Mfut. Lifre Ins. Co. (871), 38 Id. 294. It is, however, there held that the proIn Delaware (Laws, 1874, Ch. 76, ceeds of a policy, made payable to the
"heirs, executors, administrators or as.'ec. 3), a married woman is given the
creditors, unless specially mentioned in
the deed.
Under the former section, it has been
held, it must be shown affirmatively that
the insurance was made by a company
incorporated under the laws of California, that it is insurance on the life of
the debtor, and that the policy is not of
the excepted clas: Briggs v. JfeCul-
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signs" of the insured, constitute assets of his estate and are liable for his

less in a case of gross fraud: Pence v.
Makpeace (1879); 65 Ind. 345- In
deLts. But a policy payable originally
his opinion in this case, HOWvK, J.,
t,, the wife, becomes her property, and
places the decision upon broad grounds
she cannot make a valid assignment of
of pulblic policy, using the following
it to a creditor of her husband, to selanguage :
cure the latter's debt, nor can she ratify
"Where it appears, as it does in this
such an assignment, without additional
case, that the policy of insurance has
consideration, after her husband's death:
been procured and taken out by a husband and father upon his own life, and
L5ni/h
v. head (IS85), 75 Ga. 755.
has been made payable to his wife, with
The llnois statute is as follows:
the evident and only view and purpose
"It shall be lawful for any married
woman, by herself and in her own
of making suitable and necessary provision for the comfort, support and
name, or in the name of any third person, with his assent as her trustee, to
maintenance of his wife and family,
cause to be insured, for her sole use,
after his removal by death, we would
the life of her husband, for any definite
hesitate long, before we could be inperiod, or for the term of his natural
duced to hold and decide that the pro.
life; and in case of her surviving such
ceeds of the policy, or any part thereof,.
might be diverted from the beneficiary
period or term, the sum or net amount
of the insurance becoming due and
named in the policy, and applied to the
payment of the debts of the assured.
payable by the terms of the insurance,
The procurement of a policy of life inshall be payable to her, to and for her
own use, free from the claims of the repsurance, as a provision for the family of
resentatives of her husband, or any of
the assured, in the event of his death,
his creditors; trovided,however, that if
and the payment of premiums thereon
the premium of such policy is paid to by a person insolvent or of limited
any person with intent to defraud his
means, whose wife and family may be
creditors, an amount equal to the predependent upon him and his labor for
the comforts and even the necessaries of
mium so paid, with interest thereon,
shall inure to the benefit of said credilife, are acts to be fostered and encourtors, subject, however, to the statute of
aged by the law. For these acts are not
limitations."
hostile to, but we think are in full acStar & C. Ann. Stat.,
Ch. 73, Sec. III. It has been held by
cordance with, those provisions of our
the Supreme Court of Illinois that,
law, which bear upon the rights and
under this statute, an assignment by an
duties incident to the family relation.
insolvent debtor to his wife of a policy
Society cannot be benefited by the abissued in his own favor, is valid as
ject poverty or destitution of any family;
against his creditors: Cole v. Afart/le but, on the contrary, its welfare or well(I88i), 98 II1. 58.
being is largely dependent upon the
The only Indiana statute (Rev. Stat.
welfare or well-being of each and every
Sec. 3848) which is in point, is resfamily. A necessary provision for his
tricted to certificates and policies in
own household is a duty enjoined upon
beneficiary societies, but the Supreme
every man, by divine as well as human
Court of that State has held, in a case
law, and, unless the acts of a party in
of much interest, that an insurance
making such provision * * * are
policy, taken out by a husband for his
clearly and grossly fraudulent, we would
wife's benefit, is her individual propbe very loth to divert such provision, or
erty, and is not subject to his debts, un- any part thereof, from the purpose for
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which it was intended, and, leaving he
widow and the orphan destitute, apply
such provision, or a part thereof, to a
purpose never contemplated."
Iowa (Rev. Code, 1888, Secs. 1182,
2372) exempts from liability for the
debts of the insured, not only the
"avails of any life insurance," but also
endowment policies, "payable to the
assured on attaining a certain ave."
Kansas (Dassler's Comp. Laws, Ch.
5oa, Sec. 77) exempts all policies "for
the benefit of any woman, whether married or unmarried, or for the benefit of
minor children, or for the benefit ofany
invalid, aged, or infirm person," with
the limitation that "such policy of insurance, reserve or present value thereof,
thus exempt, shall not exceed in amount
a sum that may be purchased at the age
of thirty years on the continuous payment life rate American mortality, interest four and one-half per cent., net
premium, $500."

Kentucky (Act of March 12, 1870,
Sees. 30-1-2, Gen. Stat., ed. 1888, App.
pp. 4o-i) exempts policies "assigned,
transferred or made payable to" the
wife, for her benefit, or for that of any
third person, subject to the same proviso that is contained in the Illinois statute. Prior to this act such policies
were liable for the insured's debts :
Stokes v. Coffey (1872), 8 Bush (Ky.),
533. But since the act they are exempt:
7hompson v. Cundiff (1875), 11 Id.
567. In the latter case, however, the
Court "doubtingly " awarded to creditors the amount of premiums paid before the passage of the act, with interest.
Louisiana has no statute, but it has
been held in that State that, "a husband has the right to insure his life in
the interest of his wife and child, as
well as in the interest of his creditor,
and his obligation to provide for them,
in case of his death, is certainly well
recognized. If the policy issues to the -
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wife, or is properly transferred to her,
the amount stipulated therein belongs
to her when the event insured against
happens; and she cannot be forced to
inventory it as part of her husband's
estate. The object he had in view
would be defeated if a contrary doctrine prevailed. It is the wife whom
the husband seeks to protect when he
insures his life in her behalf. * * *
He has no need to protect his creditors
by such a mode, for they can protect
themselves." Succession of Ifearing
(1874), 26 La. An. 326. This decision
has been followed in cases where the
premiums bad been paid out of community funds: Successions of Clark
(1875), 27 Id. 269; Succession of
Bofenschen (1877), 29 Id. 711 ; and,
where the husband, without the knowledge of the wife, substituted for a policy in her favor one in favor of himself,
the insurer was held, upon the insured's
death, to be liable to the wife for the
amount of the insurance, less the premiums paid on the substituted policy :
Pilcher v. Nezv York Life Ins. Co.
(188), 33 Id. 322.
rhe Ailahe statute provides (Rev.
Stat. Ch. 49, Sec. 94,) that, "life and
accident policies, and the money due
thereon, are exempt from attachment,
and from all claims of creditors, when
the annual cash premium does not exceed $P50; but, when it exceeds that
sum, and the premium was paid by the
debtor, his creditors have a lien on the
policies for such sum over $15o a year,
as the debtor has paid for two years,
subject to any pledge or assignment
thereof made in good faith." In NationalLife Ins. Co, v. Haley (1886), 78
Me. 268; S.C. 25 AMER. LAW REnisTm, 613, the same question arose that
was considered in the last cited Louisiana case, and was decided the same
way. But the proceeds of the substituted policy were, in this instance, divided in proportion to the amount of
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premiums paid before and after the substitut ion, the Court citing with approval
the rule followed by WALLACE, J., in
Timayenis v. Union lfut. Life Ins. Co.
(U. S. C. Ct., S. D. N. Y., 1884), 21
Fed. Repr. 223.
The original fariland statute was
adopted in x862 (lub. Gen. Laws, Art.
45, Ch. 9, Sec. 8), and was almost
identical in terms with that of Illinois,
with the provso omitted. Afterwards,
by the Act of 1878 (Id. Sec. 200), it
was provided that "all policies of life
insurance upon the life of any person
* * * taken out for the benefit of, or
honafde assigned to, the wife or children, or any relative dependent on such
person, or any creditor, shall be vested
in such wife and children, or other
relative or creditor, free and clear from
all claims of the creditors of such insured person." The latter act is an
enabling, not a restraining act, and does
not take away any rights given by the
former: Elliolt v. Bri'an (1885), 64
Md. 368. Under the Act of 1878, a
voluntary assignment of a life policy by
a father to his sons is valid as against
creditors: Earnshaw v. Stewart, Id.
513. In IWhilridge v. Barr, (1874),
42 Id. 14o, S. C. 15 ANMER. LAW REGISTER, 339, it was held that a married
woman might make a valid assignment
of a policy on the life of a husband to
secure the latter's debt, but that such
assignment would be void, if executed
in consequence of duress on the part of
the husband.
Massachusetts (Pub. Stat. Ch. ii9,
Sec. x67) exempts not only all policies, either issued or assigned to a married woman, but also policies "effected
by any person on his own life or the life
of another, expressed to be for the benefit of such other or his representatives
or a third person." Provision is made
for the appointment of a trustee, as in
the English statute, and the proviso as
to payments with intent to defraud

creditors is identical with that of Illinois.
Subsequent to the adoption of the statute,
it was held that the assignee of a policy,
payable to the assured, his executors
and assigns, for the use of his wife and
children, but assigned by him in his
life-time for a valuable consideration,
might maintain an action against the
insurer: Bu77oughs v. State Mut. Life
Assr" Co. (1867), 97 Mass. 359. But
such a policy cannot be affected by the
will of the assured, and his executor
must account to the widow and children
for its proceeds: Gould v. Emerson
(.868), 99 Id. 154. Nor will the assignment of the wife, when she does not
survive her husband, affect the children's
interest: I.Rnickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v.
IM'itz (1868), Id. 157. And where the
policy itself stipulated that no assignment should be made, "except for the
benefit of the wife or children of the
assured," an assignee of the insured
takes no interest, but is entitled to be
repaid the premiums paid after the assignment; niti, Alut. Life Assr. Asso.
v. .Dugan (1875), 118 Id. 219. But a
policy payable to the "heirs or representatives" of the assured, is not for the
benefit of a third person within the
meaning of the statute and its proceeds
are assets for the payment of creditors:
Wason v. Colbturn (1868), 99 Id. 342.
The original Michigan statute (Act
of 3 April, 1848, Howell's Ann. Stat.,
Sees. 6300-i) restricted the exemption
to policies where the annual premium
did not exceed $3oo. But the later Act
(Howell's Ann. Stat., Sec. 4238) contains no such restriction and the exemption extends to all insurance for the
benefit of the wife or children of the
insured, and to the insurance by a married woman of the life "of any other
person."
Minnesota has no statute, except in
reference to beneficiary societies (Stat,
Vol. I, Tit. 6, Sec. 369) and co-operative associations, incorporated under a

CENTRAL

NATIONAL BANK V. HUME.

special act (Stat., Vol. 2, Tit. 6, Sec.
369 q). Butithasbeenheld in that State
that a husband has no power to surrender a policy issued in favor of his wife
or children: Ricker v. Charter Oak
Life Ins. Co. (188o), 27 Minn. 193; or

assign to a creditor such a policy, even
though his wife join in the assignment:
Allis v. Ware (I88I), 28 Id. 66.
.,rissizpiprovides (Rev. Code, See.
1261) that "the amount of any life insurance policy, not exceeding $xo,ooo,
upon any one life, shall inure to the
party or parties named as the beneficiaries thereof, freed from all liability for
the debts of the person paying the premiums thereon."
The original Aihssouri statute (Rev.
Stat., Secs. 5978-9) is in the exact
words of that of Illinois, the. proviso
limiting the annual premiums allowed
to be paid out of the funds of the husband to $500. By the revision of 1879
this limit was increased from $30o, which
it had previously been. But the later
Act (Rev. Stat., Sec. 5981) contains no
proviso, and also authorizes the appointment of a trustee, as in Massachusetts. Sec. 598o of the Rev. Stat, confers upon an unmarried woman the
same right to insure the life of her father
or brother as a married woman possesses in regard to her husband's life.
In ChaterOak Life Ins.Co. v. Brant
(1871),47 M o. 419, it was held that the
statute did not protect a policy where
the annual premium was more than
$300, and that an assignment of such a
policy by husband and wife to creditors
of the former gave the creditors the
right to receive the whole of the insurancemoney. In Bakerv. Young (i871),
Id. 453, it was further held that the
statute did not impair the power of husband and wife together to assign a
policy for the wife's benefit during the
life-time of both. And where some of
the premiums were paid by the husband,
when solvent, and the remainder after

he had become insolvent, the annual
payment being in excess of $300, the
proceeds were divided between his
widow and his creditors, in proportion
to the amount of premiums paid by him
while solvent and insolvent, the Court
ruling that the statute was only intended
to apply to a husband in embarra.sed or
insolvent circumstances, and that insurance paid for by him while solvent, was
the property of his wife, no matter how
large the premium, and under no circumstances could be made liable for his
debts: Pullis v. Rolson (I880), 73 Id.
2OI. In Chapianv. AMcI/wrath (iS82),
77 Id. 38, a husband, not being indebted,
made a parol assignment to his wife,
without consideration, of a policy of insurance on his own life. He continued
to pay the premiums until his death,
meanwhile having become insolvent.
The annual premium appears to have
been less than $300. It was held that
the assignment was valid as against
creditors, there being no fraudulent intent
shown, and the Court saying: "It was
the original and legitimate purpose of
life insurance to provide for the widow
and orphans, on the death of those upon
whose exertions, while living, they depended for support."
Neither Nbraska nor Arivada has
any statutory provision upon the subject
under consideration, nor do any of the
questions involved appear to have been
before the courts of either State.
In ANew Hanpshire (Gen. Laws, Ch.
175, Secs. x-3) there is a general exemption of all policies for the benefit of
married women, as well as policies
"effected by any person on his own life
or the life of another, expressed to be
for the benefit of a third person," unless
"procured with intent and to the effect
to defraud creditors," in which case the
creditors are entitled to the amount of
the premiums only. It has been held
in New Hampshire that an assignment
by a married woman of a policy cn her
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husband's life as security for his debt,
is a contract made 1byher as surety or
guarantor for him, and, therefore, not
binding on her; also that a husband has
no power to assign such a policy: Stokell
v. Ailmbal 10879) 59 N. t1. 13.
t'wv Jers,'y, by Act of 19 February,
iS5r (Rev. Stat. p. 640. 20-1), exempts
generally all insurance for the benefit of
a married woman upon the life of her
husband. Under this act, it has been
held that where a married woman insured her husband's life for the benefit
of her children, and afterwards assigned
the policy to a creditor of the husband,
who paid the subsequent premiums, the
children were entitled only to the value
of the policy at the time of its assignment: Lan.hum v. A'no/le's (18711,
22 N. J. Eq. 594. And where a policy
in favor of wife and children was assigned by the husband and wife together
to secure a debt of the former, the assignment was held to vest in the assignee
the right to the proceeds, upon the husband's death in the life-time of his wife:
De Rouge v. E/1it 1 (1873), 23 Id. 486.
By a subsequent statute (Act of 8 April,
1875, Rev. Stat., p. 640. 22) a married
woman is given the same power to
assign life policies as if she were
single.
The New York statute (Acts of i84o
and 1858, Rev. Stat., $th ed., 1889, pp.
26oo-2) is identical with that of Illinois,
except the proviso, which is as follows:
"But when the premium paid in any
year out of the property or funds of the
husband shall exceed $5oo, such exemptions from such claims shall not
apply to so much of said premium so
paid as shall be in excess of S5oo, but
such excess, with the interest thereon,
shall inure to the benefit of his creditors." By the later Act of 187o (Rev.
Stat., p. 2604), a married woman may
surrender her interest in a policy "in
the same manner as required by law to
pass her dower right in lands of l:er

husband," or, upon dying without i-sue,
may dispose of the same by will. And
by the Act of 1879 (Rev. Stat.,p. 2605)
a married woman and her representatives, with the written consent of her
husband, are given powerto assign .-uch
a policy. Prior to this Act an assignment of a policy by a married woman
wasinvalid: Eaciev. Slimnon (1S62),
26 N. Y. 9; Barr'y v. Equitable Life
Assr. Soc. (1875), 59 Id. 587; Bal-rj'
v. Byune (IS77), 71 Id. z61 ; Baron
v. Brummer (I885), 1oo Id. 372;
York Life his. Co.
Wkitehead v. Xez',
(iS86), 102 Id. z43. But where such
an assignment was made and no subsequent premiums were paid or tendered
by the wife, the invalidity of the a-signment did not prevent a forfeiture:
F)ank v. Jftt. Life Ints.
Co. of New
York (1386), Id.266. The joining of
the husband in a written assignment is
a sufficient "written consent" to meet
the requirements of the Act of I879: Andersonv.Goldsinidt (i886), 103 Id. 617.
Where, however, a policy is assigned
or made payable to the wife only, she
might, prior to the Act of 1879, make a
valid assignment: Jloehringv. Afitehell
(1846), 1 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 264; Okisted v. 'eyes (iSSi), 85 N. Y. 593. In
a recent case in the Superior Court of
New York City the statutes and decisions bearing upon the right of a married
woman to assign a policy in her favor
will be found thoroughly considered in
opinions by both the majority and minority of a divided Court: Brick v.
CanPbell (1887), 54 N. Y. Super. Ct.
305. It has been held in New York
that a father has no power to surrender
a policy on his own life, taken out by
him in favor of his children: Garner
v. Germania Life its. Co. (188-,), iO
N. Y. 266.
The North Carolina constitutional
provision has already been given on
page 433, stPra. It has been held in
that State that a child, forwhose benefit
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a father has insured his life, takes a
vested interest in the policy: Conigland
v. Smith (1878), 79 N. C. 303; and
that the father has no power to surrender such a policy: Hooker v. Sugg,
S..Ct. N. C., Feb. 26, x889.
Ohio (Rev. Stat., ed. 1884, Sees.
.3628-9) exempts insurance on his life
effected by any person for the benefit of
his widow and children, or of either, as
well as insurance effected by any married woman on the life of her husband.
In the former case, the statute contains
a provision that "'the amount of premium annually paid on such policy
shall not exceed the sum of $15o, and,
in case of such excess, there shall be
paid to the beneficiaries named in the
policy such portion of the insurance as
the sum of $15o will bear tolthe whole
annual premium, and the residue to the
representatives of the deceased;" and,
where the insurance is effected by the
wife, it is provided that, "if a policy be
procured by any person with intent to
defraud his creditors, an amount equal
to the premium paid thereon, with interest, shall inure to the benefit of his
creditors, subject, however, to the statute of limitations." The statute also
gives to a married woman, to whom a
policy is payable solely for her own use,
the power to sell, assign or surrender
the same, the partywhose life is insured
concurring in and becoming a party to
the transfer. By this statute, a policy
taken out in the name of a married
woman on the life of her husband becomes her separate property, and she is
to be treated, in regard to'such policy,
-'a feme sole: FratrnalAtut. Lift
-AF.Co. v. ApjWlegate (1857), 7 Ohio St.
292. And the statute apllies as well to
a policy issued by a company organized
and conducted outside the limits of
Ohio as to one issued by a company of
that State: Cross v. Armstrong (1887),
44 Id.613.
Oregon has no statute, nor reported
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decisions, bearing upon the subject
under consideration.
In Pennsylvaniathe Act of 15 April,
1868 (P. L. 103, Purd. Dig, p. 924)
provides that "all policies of life insurance or annuities upon the life of any
person, which may hereafter mature, or
which have been or shall be taken out
for the benefit of, or bona fide assigned
to the wife or children of any relative
dependent upon such person, shall be
vested in such wife or children or other
relative, free and clear from all claims
of the creditors of such person." The
Act of i May, 1876, Sec. 25 (P. L. 59,
Prd. Dig. p. 9x4), also provides that
policies issued by companies under that
Act for the benefit of any married
woman "shall inure to her separate use
and benefit, and that of her children,
independently of her husband or his
creditors, or the person effecting the
same or his creditors. If the premium
is paid by any person with intent to defraud his creditors, an amount equal to
the premiums so paid, with interest,
shall inure to theit benefit." The Pennsylvania cases of Elliott'sAeal(i865),
50 Pa. 75, which arose before the Act
of x868, and _4fcCutcheon's A,peal
(188I), 99 Id. 133, arising after that
Act, are fully considered in the opinion
of the Supreme Court in the principal
case on pages 428-9, supra. In the
case of Trough's Estate (187t), 8 Phila.
(Pa.) 214, the question whether an assignment to the children of the insured
of a life policy for $3000, issued and
paid for prior to 1868, constituted a
fraud on creditors, was considered by
the Court of Common Pleas in an
opinion by ALLIsoNi, P. J., who said:
" There is nothing to call in question
the honesty and good faith of the transaction, nor is the provision, which, by
the assignment, was made for certain of
the children of the assignor, unreasonable, nor was it made in contemplation
of insolvency, or with an intent to de-
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fraud creditors. That a provision for
children under such circumstances is
valid, ought not, under the settled law,
to be questioned. So far from the law
(ondemning such deeds as void, ;,ostnUl.tial settlements even are supported
in cquity without the intervention of a
trustee. When they are fairly made,
and the provision is reasonable, the huaI and not being in debt at the time, and
they are free from any badge of fraudulent intent, they will be upheld; and
what a husband may do for his wife, a
father may certainly do for his children.
* * * Theonlypossibleclaimthecredi.
tors could sustain in the premises would
be for the amount of premiums paid by
Trough to keep the policy alive, after
lie became insolvent. Whatever sum
o:f money was appropriated by him to
secure this end, which was of right the
money of his creditors, ought to be
taken from the ftnd in dispute, and
returned to them now; but this does
not give to creditors any just claim to
the remaining part of the $300o." This
case was reversed in the Supreme Court,
but upon an entirely different pcint:
Trough's Estate (x874), 75 Pa. 115;
S. C.,
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In a recent case it has been held
that, where a policy was payable to a
wife, and, in case of her death before
her husband, to her children, an assignment by husband and wife does not
affect the children's interest: Brown's
Afifpeat, S. Ct. Pa., April 8, 1889.
Rhode Island (Pub. Stat., ed. x882,
Ch. 166, Sees. 21-2) exempts insurance
"which shall not exceed in the aggregate the sum of $io,ooo," on the life of
any person for the benefit of a married
woman, and authorizes the appointment
of a trustee to hold and manage such
policy or its proceeds. Under this statute, the fact that the wife has filed a
petition for divorce, which is pending
and undetermined at the maturity of a
policy on her husband's life payable to
122.

her, will not estop her from demanding
the proceeds of such policy: -F-InaLife
Is. CO. v. MIso (I884), 14 R. I. 583.
An assignment of a policy, payable to
the wife and children of the insured,
which is made by the insured and his
wife t. secure a debt of the former,
pas.es only the interest of the wife, and
does affect that of the children, each
of whom is entitled to receive an equal
share with the assignee, of the proceeds
of the insurance: Conneelicutl'u/.Lfe
Ins. (o. v. Baldwin (1885), 15 Id. 107.
South Carolina has no statute, nor
reported decisions, bearing upon the
subject under consideration.
The Code of Tennessee (Sec. 3135)
provides that "a life insurance effected
by a husband on his own life shall inure to the benefit of the widow and
next of kin, to be distributed as personal property, free from the claims of
his creditors." This statute does not
deprive a husband of the right to assign
a policy on his own life to a creditor,
but the latter can retain out of the proceeds only the amount of his debt and
the premiums paid by him to keep the
policy alive: Rison v. Vikerson (1856),
.
3 Sneed (Tenn.) 565 Such a policy
may be disposed of by will: Williamsv.
Corson (1S75), 2 Tenn. Ch. 269; s.c.
(876), 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 516; TennesseeLod,ev. Ladd(188o), 5 Lea(Tenn.)
716. But a policy payable to the" legal
heirs" of the insured, is not assignable
by him: Gosling v. Caldwel (1878), 1
Lea (Tenn.) 454.
Texas has no statutory provision, but
the Supreme Court of that State has
held that, where a p -licy is made payable to the "heirs or assigns" of the
insured, the latter may assign it in his
life-time, but, if he does not do so, his
heirs are entitled, upon his death, to the
proceeds as against creditors: Mkullins
v. Thompson (1879), 51 Tex. 7. In
Leay v. Taylor (1886), 66 Id. 652, the
right of a wife to the proceeds of a
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policy originally issued in her favor, but
renewed in favor of a creditor, was involved, but was left by the Court undecided.
The original Vermont statute of 1849
(Rev. Laws, ed. 88o, SeCs. 2340-I),
was in the same words as that of Illinois, with a clause restricting the exemption to cases where the annual premium did not exceed $3o. By the
same Act (Rev. Laws, Sec. 2344) an
unmarried woman was given the right
to cause to be insured the life of her
father or brother 1"as provided in case
of married women." The Act of 1856
(Rev. Laws, Secs. 2343-5), contains no
restriction and broadly exempts all policies effected by one person on the life
of another and expressed to be for the
benefit of the latter. This Act also authorizes the appointment of a trustee to
hold and manage the interest of a married woman in her policy or its proceeds.
By the Act of t88o (Rev. Laws, Sec.
2342), a wife is given the power to assign or surrender a policy in her favor
on her husband's life, with the written
consent of the latter.
Virginia has no statute, but it has
been held in that State that the payment of premiums by an insolvent is
fraudulent as to creditors, and that, so
far as his means are thus withdrawn
from his creditors, they are entitled to
havethe amount so paid applied to their
claims, from the proceeds of the policies: Stiglr v. Stigler (1883), 77 Va.
163. But it would seem that an exemption allowed by the charter of the
insuring company, such as is cited on
page 418, suPra,would be sustained by
the courts: Whitehurst v. Whitehurst
(x887), 83 Id. 153.
West Virginia has no statute, nor
does the question under consideration
seem to have arisen in the courts of that
State.
The Wisconsin statute (Rev. Stat.,
ed. 1878, Sec. 2347), exempts all insur-

ance for the benefit of a married woman,
providing, however, that " if the nnual premium on any such policy sha.l
exceed the sum of $150, and is paid by
any person with intent to defraud h.
creditors, an amount equal to the premiums so paid in excess of said sum,
with interest thereon, shall inure to the
benefit of such creditors, subject, however, to the statute of limitations." It
has been held in Wisconsin that one
who procures insurance on his own life,
and pays the premiums, may dispose of
such insurance by will, assignment, or
otherwise, to the exclusion of the beneficiary: Clark v. .Durand (I861), 12
Wis. 223; ICeman v. Howard (1868),
23 Id. xo8; Foster v. Gilt (i88o), 50
Id. 6o3. But the case is different with
a certificate in a mutual benefit society,
whose object is "to establish a widows'
and orphans' fund": Balloz v. Gi.'e
(188o), Id. 614. A married woman
may assign a policy upon her husband's
life in her favor: Archbald v. AIztual
Life Ins. Co. of Chicago (1875), 38 Id.
542.

From the foregoing review of the
statutes and decisions in the various
States, it will be seen that the tendcncy
has been steadily in the direction of extending the exemption of life insurance
policies, issued or assigned to the wife
or children of the insured, from the
claims of creditors. Both Legislatures
and Courts are inclined to view such
policies,in the language ofJudge HOWK,
cited sup-a, as "a necessary provision
for (the insured's) own hou.-ehold," "to
be fostered and encouraged l.ylaw."
In the principal case the Supreme Court
of the United States falls in with this
tendency, putting its decision upon the
express ground of " public policy," and
in so doing it is clearly in accord with
the weight of authority. But the opinion of the Court also recognizes that the
right of a debtor to thus make a reasonable provision for those dependent
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on him after his death, mu.,t not be
abused. As suon as that provision lecomes tainted with a fraudulent intent,
it is no longer entitled to protection.
What will constitute fraud, when not
defined by statutes, mu.st be determined
by the facts of each particular case, as
tested by the conscience of a chancellor cr the verdict of a jury.
There ika conflict of authority as to the
proper nile, in the absence of statutory
regulation, to be observed, when creditors
are permitted to come in upon the fund.
It has been more often held that they
were entitled only to the amount of the
premiums paid by the insolvent, with
accrued interest. This is the ruling of the
principal case, and in .-E~na ational
Bank v. Uni./ Stee:,s Life Ins. Co.
(U. S. C. Ct., S. 1). N. Y., ISS5), 24
Fed. Repr. 770, which is there cited, it
is said by WItEELIR, J.:"The amount
due or, the policy does not represent the
property of the husband, nor any part
of his estate, beyond the amount of the
premiums. The insurance was upon
(the wife's) interest in his life, t.ot the
creditors interest in his life, and the
amount due represents her interest, and,
beyond the amount of the premiums, is
hers. An amount equal to the amount
of the premiums may represent so much
of his estate, and in equity belong to his
creditors. They may * * * reach that
amount, but there appears to be no fair
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ground on which they can reach more."
The contrary view, which would give
the creditors the entire proceeds of the
insurance, is sustained by an elaborate
argument and review of the authorities
in the case of Fearn v. Ward (1886),
8o Ala. 555, which was a second hearing of the case in 65 Ala. 33. cited
on page 433, stpra. But the former
rule seems the more equitable, and has
been generally adopted in the statutes.
The consideration of this case has
nece.sarily led us some distance into the
question of the assignment of policie-,
originally written for the benefit of the
in-ured's wife and children, although it
has not been attempted to treat that
branch of the subject at all exhaustively.
In a well-considered and interesting
case the Supreme Court of the District
of Columbia has recently passed upon
the question of a wife's powerto assign
an ordinary paid up policy of life insurance, effected by her husband on his
own life for her benefit, and it has been
held that she has such power: Fordf v.
T,'aveles' Ins. Co. (iS88), 6 Mack.
(D. C.) 384. There will be found in
24 ANIERICAN LAW REGISTER, 753, an
article on " Assignments of Life Insurance Policies," in which the authorities
bearing upon the subject are collected
with great care and thoroughness, and
are elaborately considered.
JAMES C. SELLERS.

